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Abstract
In two studies, the connection between dissociative experiences as measured by the Dissociative
Experiences Scale (DES) and memory distortions was examined. In the first study, DES scores of female
students (N= 42) were not found to be related to reality monitoring failures. There was, however, a
significant association between DES and false positive memory failures, suggesting a response bias in
participants scoring high on the DES. In the second study, students (N= 70) completed the DES, a
measure of fantasy proneness, and the Life Events Inventory (LEI). The LEI lists a large number of
discrete events and requires respondents to indicate whether these events have happened to them before
the age of 10. A positive connection between DES and LEI was found, such that higher DES scores
were accompanied by more positive answers to the LEI. The connection between DES and positive
response tendencies to LEI items was evident for both neutral and negative items and was carried by
fantasy proneness. Taken together, the data indicate that high DES scores are related to a positive
response bias tendency. This may have substantial implications for retrospective studies that attempt to
link high DES scores to traumatic antecedents. # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Over the past few years, several studies have addressed the frequency of dissociative
experiences (e.g., derealization, depersonalization, amnesia) in normal and clinical populations
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(see, for a review, van IJzendoorn & Schuengel, 1996). The large majority of these studies has
relied on the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), a 28-item self-
report questionnaire that measures the frequency of various types of dissociative experiences.
The DES is not only a widely used research instrument, but it is also recommended as a
screening tool for dissociative disorders that are thought to have a traumatic etiology (e.g.,
dissociative identity disorder, dissociative amnesia; Ross, 1997). Meanwhile, some authors have
expressed concerns about the suitability of the DES as a screening tool for dissociative
psychopathology (Frankel, 1990, 1996; Hacking, 1995; Merckelbach, Muris & Rassin, 1999).
The bottom line of their critique is that dissociation is an ill-defined concept that is dicult to
separate from relatively benign phenomena such as everyday cognitive failures and fantasy
proneness. Indeed, previous studies have found robust correlations between the DES and
measures of cognitive failures and/or fantasy proneness (e.g., Merckelbach et al., 1999;
Rauschenberg & Lynn, 1995).
The potential implications of findings such as these are twofold. To begin with, due to its
close links to benign characteristics, it might well be the case that the DES produces a high
frequency of false positive cases when it is used as a screening tool for dissociative
psychopathology. Germane to this issue is a study by Sandberg and Lynn (1992, p. 722) who
noted that ‘‘the 8 subjects who scored in the upper 2% of the population on the DES failed to
meet DSM-III criteria for a dissociative disorder, which suggests that the DES, when used with
nonclinical samples, is likely to yield a large number of false positives for dissociative
disorders’’. A second implication has to do with retrospective research on the causal
connections between dissociation and trauma. If it is accepted that high dissociators also score
high on measures of fantasy proneness and memory failures then the question arises how
reliably their retrospective accounts of childhood events are (e.g., Rauschenberg & Lynn,
1995). While it is true that high DES individuals more often report aversive childhood events
than do control individuals, there is also research showing that the DES does not correlate
with independent data on traumatic experiences (e.g., hospital records; Sanders & Giolas,
1991). In the words of van IJzendoorn and Schuengel (1996, p. 376): ‘‘The link between
traumatic experiences and dissociation is not based on convincing data that is independent of
the respondents’ autobiographical memory’’.
The present studies addressed the question whether high DES individuals display memory
biases that might contribute to erroneous reports of autobiographical events. In this context,
two types of memory biases are relevant. To begin with, the content of various DES items
(e.g., ‘‘Some people find that they cannot remember whether they have done something or just
have thought about doing that thing; for example, not knowing whether they have just mailed
a letter or have just thought about mailing it’’) suggests that the DES might be sensitive to
reality monitoring disruptions (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Reality monitoring
refers to the capacity to discriminate between memories of events that really happened and
memories of events that were only imagined. Reality monitoring failures may give rise to
powerful illusory memories (e.g., Parks, 1997). A possible link between dissociative tendencies
and reality monitoring failures is also suggested by the robust correlation between DES and
measures of individual proneness to everyday lapses and minor blunders (e.g., the Cognitive
Failures Questionnaire; CFQ; see Merckelbach et al., 1999).
A second type of memory bias that might be connected to dissociative tendencies is
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confabulation. It is important to stress that we use the term confabulation in a rather broad
way to refer to memory failures that also include relatively benign errors such as endorsing
logically plausible, but false positive items (e.g., Roediger, Wheeler & Rajaram, 1993). A
possible connection between dissociation and false positive response confabulations is
suggested by the correlation between DES and fantasy proneness (e.g., Merckelbach et al.,
1999).
The present studies sought to explore the links between DES, reality monitoring disruptions,
and false positive confabulations in non-clinical samples. The relevance of this type of study is
obvious: if it could be shown that high dissociators exhibit reality monitoring disruptions and/
or confabulations, then caution is warranted in interpreting their self-reports of aversive
childhood events.
2. Study 1
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
The sample consisted of 42 female undergraduate students who volunteered to participate in
the experiment. Their mean age was 20 years (SD= 1.2; range: 19–24 years). Subjects were
tested in a large group session. They were told that the experiment was about selecting
adequate themes for advertisement campaigns.
2.1.2. Slide presentation
Subjects underwent a reality monitoring task that was modeled after the task described by
Intraub and Homan (1992). More specifically, they were shown a series of 40 slides. Half of
the slides were straightforward photographs of common objects or situations (e.g., a horse, an
umbrella, a building) taken from the International Aective Picture System (Lang, Ohman &
Vaitl, 1988). The other half of the slides consisted of short paragraphs describing a scene or
object (‘‘scissors on a desk’’; ‘‘a church against a background of small houses’’). Ten out of 20
paragraphs corresponded to pictures that were shown (e.g., ‘‘a brown horse’’). The 20
paragraph and 20 photograph slides were presented in a random sequence. Each slide was
presented for 5 sec. After slide oset, subjects rated on a 7-point scale how good they thought
the theme (paragraph or photograph) was for advertisement purposes. Interslide intervals were
10 sec.
2.1.3. Questionnaires
Following the series of 40 slides, subjects completed the Dissociative Experiences Scale
(DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent,
Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982), and the Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ;
Merckelbach, Muris, Schmidt, Rassin & Horselenberg, 1998a). Completion of these
questionnaires took about 15 min.
The DES (Cronbach alpha=0.88) is a self-report instrument containing 28 items that
address dissociative experiences such as disturbances in memory, awareness, and cognition.
H. Merckelbach et al. / Personality and Individual Dierences 28 (2000) 49–58 51
Subjects indicate on 100-mm visual analog scales the degree to which the experiences described
by the items apply to them (anchors: 0=not at all; 100=very much ). Scores are averaged
across items to obtain a mean DES score. A large number of studies have found support for
the psychometric qualities of the DES (van IJzendoorn & Schuengel, 1996). That is, the DES
possesses excellent internal consistency and test-retest stability (e.g., Bernstein & Putnam,
1986). In addition, individuals with dissociative psychopathology display higher DES scores
than control individuals (e.g., Putnam et al., 1996) and DES scores correlate significantly with
self-reported traumatic events (e.g., Chu & Dill, 1990; DiTomasso & Routh, 1993; Nijman
et al., 1999).
The CFQ (Cronbach alpha=0.91) is a 25-item self-report instrument that measures the
frequency of everyday lapses and minor blunders (e.g., ‘‘Do you forget appointments?’’).
Subjects indicate on a 5-point scale how often they have experienced each cognitive failure in
the past month (anchors: 0=never; 5=very often ). Item scores are summed to obtain a total
CFQ score. Merckelbach, Muris, Nijman, and de Jong (1996) summarize evidence to show that
the psychometric properties of the Dutch CFQ are satisfactory.
The CEQ (Cronbach alpha=0.80) is a 25-item measure of fantasy proneness that is scaled in
the true/false form. CEQ items were derived from the extensive case descriptions of fantasy
proneness provided by Wilson and Barber (1983). Typical examples are ‘‘In general, I spend at
least half of the day fantasizing or daydreaming’’ and ‘‘My fantasies are so vivid that they are
like a good movie’’. The number of yes-answers is summed to yield a total CEQ score. There is
solid evidence for the reliability and validity of the CEQ (Merckelbach et al., 1998a).
2.1.4. Memory test
After subjects had completed the DES, CFQ, and CEQ, they were given a surprise
recognition-test. This test contained 40 items of which 10 pertained to photographs that
subjects had seen, 10 pertained to paragraphs that subjects had read, 10 referred to stimuli of
which subjects had seen both photographs and paragraphs, and 10 referred to new objects or
situations that were not included in the slide series. Subjects were instructed to indicate
whether or not they had seen the item during the slide series and if so, whether they had seen
it as a paragraph, a photograph or as both paragraph and photograph. Thus, subjects could
make two types of memory failures: misidentifying a paragraph as a photograph or vice versa
(i.e., reality monitoring errors; maximum score=20) and false positive responses, that is, cases
Table 1
Pearson correlations between dissociation (DES), fantasy proneness (CEQ), cognitive failures (CFQ), reality moni-
toring (RM) errors, and confabulation (N= 42)
DES CEQ CFQ
CEQ 0.55c
CFQ 0.33b 0.15
RM errors 0.09 0.09 0.07
Confabulation 0.39b 0.25a ÿ0.14
a p< 0.10; bp< 0.05; cp< 0.01 (one-tailed).
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in which subjects reported a picture and/or a paragraph when, in fact, neither a picture nor a
paragraph had been presented during the slide series (confabulations; maximum score=10).
2.2. Results and discussion
Mean scores on the DES, CFQ, and CEQ were 23.6 (SD= 12.1), 43.3 (SD= 10.4), and 7.9
(SD= 3.8), respectively. Mean reality monitoring errors and confabulations were 0.95
(SD= 1.36; maximum=5) and 0.50 (SD= 1.02; maximum=4), respectively. Table 1 shows
the Pearson product-moment correlations between questionnaire scores and recognition errors.
As can be seen, the association between DES and reality monitoring errors failed to reach
significance. However, the correlation between DES and confabulation (i.e., false positive
recognition errors) did attain significance. While there were no robust connections between
CFQ and CEQ, on the one hand, and memory measures, on the other hand, the association
between fantasy proneness (CEQ) and confabulation approached significance (r= 0.25,
p= 0.06; one-tailed). Both CFQ and CEQ were significantly correlated with DES. Although
partialling out the contribution of fantasy proneness (CEQ) attenuated the correlation between
DES and confabulation, this correlation remained significant (r= 0.31, p< 0.05).
2.3. Discussion
Three conclusions can be drawn from these results. To begin with, the correlations between
DES, on the one hand, and CFQ and CEQ, on the other hand, were positive and significant, a
finding that replicates the results of previous studies (e.g., Merckelbach et al., 1999;
Rauschenberg & Lynn, 1995). Apparently, critics of the DES (e.g., Frankel, 1990; 1996;
Hacking, 1995; Spanos, 1996) are correct in assuming that this instrument is sensitive to
relatively benign characteristics such as everyday cognitive failures and fantasy proneness.
Secondly, the hypothesis that these characteristics would promote a relatively deficient reality
monitoring in high dissociators was not borne out by the data. As a matter of fact, no
connection was found between DES and reality monitoring. Interestingly, in what seems to be
the only other study that explored the relationship between dissociation and reality monitoring,
van den Hout, Merckelbach, and Pool (1996) also failed to find evidence for high dissociators
exhibiting poor reality monitoring. That study relied on reality monitoring tasks tapping
memory for actions (what did I do?). The authors argued that it may well be the case that high
dissociators are characterized by a disturbed reality monitoring of perceptions (what did I see?)
rather than actions and they suggested that their null findings might be explained along these
lines. Clearly, the current study does not support such an interpretation. In the present study,
perceptual reality monitoring was measured in the way proposed by Intraub and Homan
(1992), but even so reality monitoring performance and dissociation were found to be
unrelated. Yet, one potential limitation that qualifies this finding is that reality monitoring
error scores tended to be quite low and this may have introduced a range restriction that
attenuated correlations. Lastly, and most important, evidence was found to suggest that
dissociation and false positive recognition tendencies (i.e., confabulation) co-vary. This
connection was only partially mediated by fantasy proneness, because partialling out the
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contribution of fantasy proneness reduced the correlation between dissociation and
confabulation, but did not make it disappear.
3. Study 2
The link between dissociation and confabulation found in Study 1 adds weight in favour of
the view that certain memory biases may confound high dissociators’ self-report of traumatic
events (e.g., Spanos, 1996; Frankel, 1990). However, one could raise the question whether false
positive response tendencies on a memory task that involves material without personal
relevance have any implications for self-reports of autobiographical events. In other words, do
positive response tendencies also occur when high dissociators are asked whether or not they
have experienced certain types of life events? Germane to this issue is a study of Johnson,
Edman and Danko (1995) who had subjects complete the DES as well as a 22-item ‘‘bad
things’’ scale. A significant correlation between DES and scores on the bad things scale
(r= 0.40) was found, such that high dissociators reported a higher frequency of negative life
experiences. This correlation remained at the same level when items referring to severe trauma
(e.g., sexual abuse) were removed from the bad things scale leaving only items in the scale that
pertained to mildly aversive experiences (e.g., ‘‘I have been sold defective products’’). While
this finding is consistent with the idea of high dissociators overreporting aversive life
experiences, there is an alternative explanation, namely that ‘‘persons reporting abuse are more
sensitive to and/or better able to recall other negative events than those not reporting such
abuse’’ (Johnson et al., 1995; p. 795). To circumvent these ambiguities, Study 2 took the
following approach: undergraduates filled in a Life Events Inventory (LEI; e.g., Garry,
Manning, Loftus & Sherman, 1996) that covered a broad range of discrete life events, some of
which were relatively neutral or even positive while others fell in the ‘‘bad things’’ category. If
a false positive response tendency rather than a heightened sensitivity and/or better recall of
aversive life experiences is characteristic for high dissociators, one would expect positive and
significant correlations between DES and scores on both negative and neutral LEI items. Study
2 tested this prediction.
3.1. Method
A sample of 70 undergraduates (58 women) completed the DES (Cronbach alpha=0.95),
CEQ (Cronbach alpha=0.74), and LEI (Cronbach alpha=0.83). Their mean age was 18.4
years (SD= 3.3 years; range: 16–43 years). Subjects volunteered to participate in a laboratory
experiment that had nothing to do with the present study. During the preexperimental waiting
period, they filled in several questionnaires among them the DES, CEQ, and LEI.
The LEI was developed for the purpose of this study, but closely followed the type of items
described by Garry et al. (1996). It contains 60 items, each describing a highly specific and
discrete event. Forty items pertain to neutral or even positive experiences (e.g., found a silver
ring; went with my school to Disney land; collected small insects and put them in a glass jar),
while 20 items refer to aversive events (e.g., almost drowned in the swimming pool; almost
choked on a piece of candy). Subjects were asked to indicate on 7-point scales (anchors:
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1=definitely did not happen; 7=definitely did happen ) how certain they were that the events
listed by the items had happened to them before the age of 10. Scores were averaged to obtain
a total LEI score. In addition, scores were averaged for neutral and negative items of the LEI
separately (LEI-Neutral and LEI-Negative, respectively).
3.2. Results and discussion
Mean scores on the DES, CEQ, and LEI were 20.1 (SD= 14.3), 7.9 (SD= 3.6), and 3.3
(SD= 0.58), respectively. Table 2 presents the Pearson product-moment correlations between
DES, CEQ, DES controlling for CEQ, LEI-Total, LEI-Neutral, and LEI-Negative. As can be
seen, there were positive correlations between DES and all three LEI measures (i.e., Total,
Neutral, and Negative). Thus, the higher the DES score the stronger the tendency to indicate
that LEI items had happened. This association was not restricted to negative LEI items, as the
correlation between DES and LEI-Neutral also attained significance. In passing, it should be
noted that the correlation between LEI-Negative and LEI-Neutral was positive and significant
(r= 0.60, p< 0.01).
The correlations between fantasy proneness (CEQ) and the various LEI indices were all
positive and significant. As in Study 1 and in previous studies (Merckelbach et al., 1999;
Rauschenberg & Lynn, 1995), there was a robust association between DES and fantasy
proneness. Partialling out the contribution of fantasy proneness, reduced the correlations
between DES and the various LEI measures to practically zero (see right hand column Table
2).
A similar pattern of results was found when correlational analyses were restricted to women
(n= 58). Again, there were positive correlations between DES and both LEI-Negative and
LEI-Neutral (r= 0.50 and r= 0.31, respectively; p’s <0.01) that disappeared when the
influence of fantasy proneness was partialled out. All in all, the present data suggest that high
dissociators exhibit a positive response bias that is strongly linked to their heightened levels of
fantasy proneness.
Table 2
Pearson (and partial) correlations between dissociation (DES), fantasy proneness (CEQ), and scores on the Life
Events Inventory (LEI) (N= 70)
DES CEQ DES controlling for CEQ
CEQ 0.63a
LEI Total 0.39a 0.53a 0.04
LEI Neutral 0.29a 0.41a 0.00
LEI Negative 0.44a 0.58a 0.08
a p< 0.01 (one-tailed).
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4. General discussion
Study 1 demonstrated that dissociative tendencies are accompanied by a false positive
response style rather than a disrupted reality monitoring. Study 2 showed that dissociative
tendencies are related to a heightened frequency of armative responses to items about highly
diverse life events. This was true not only for negative items, but also for items referring to
relatively neutral experiences. Unless one assumes that people with dissociative tendencies have
a more eventful life than those without such tendencies, this finding indicates that high
dissociators employ liberal criteria in deciding whether or not a given item corresponds to an
autobiographical memory. The findings of Study 1 and 2 also suggest that these liberal criteria
derive, at least in part, from fantasy proneness. A limitation of both studies is that they heavily
relied on female college students. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these findings can be
replicated in samples with a more balanced sex distribution and/or in clinical samples.
A number of authors have claimed that childhood abuse may act as a developmental
antecendent of dissociative tendencies as measured by the DES (e.g., DiTomasso & Routh,
1993; Chu & Dill, 1990). For example, Chu and Dill (1990, p. 891) administered the DES as
well as self-report measures of childhood trauma to a sample of psychiatric inpatients and
concluded that ‘‘the correlation between some kinds of childhood abuse experiences and
elevated Dissociative Experiences Scale scores strongly suggests that dissociative experiences
are linked to childhood trauma. Certainly, childhood abuse and the presence of a post-
traumatic or dissociative disorder should be suspected in patients who have substantial levels
of dissociation’’. The results of the current studies make plain that this conclusion is
problematic, because it ignores the possibility that trauma reports of high dissociators are
compromised by a positive response bias. Further evidence for the presence of such a bias in
high dissociators comes from three sources. To begin with, a number of studies (e.g.,
Merckelbach, Muris, Wessel & van Koppen, 1998b; Ost, Fellows & Bull, 1997) have explored
the connection between DES and the tendency to accept misleading information as indexed by
the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS; Gudjonsson, 1992, 1997). In general, these studies
have found definite links between DES and suggestibility, such that higher DES scores are
accompanied by higher suggestibility scores for misleading statements, even when these
misleading statements pertain to autobiographical events (Ost et al., 1997). Secondly, in their
laboratory study on the creation of pseudomemories, Hyman and Billings (1998) noted that
high DES scores are a powerful predictor of the creation and acceptance of pseudomemories.
Finally, several correlational studies have documented that compared to control subjects,
subjects scoring high on the DES not only report more aversive childhood events, but also
report more paranormal experiences (e.g., Ross & Joshi, 1992; Wolfradt, 1997). Some authors
have concluded from this that ‘‘paranormal experiences are dissociative in nature and linked to
childhood trauma and other dissociative symptom clusters’’ (Ross & Joshi, 1992, p. 360), but a
more parsimonious explanation would be that due to a lowered response criterion, high DES
individuals are more likely to report traumatic and paranormal experiences.
To sum up, then, the present findings indicate that high dissociators have a positive response
bias mediated by fantasy proneness that may potentially compromise their autobiographical
reports. Thus, caution is warranted in interpreting the correlation between DES and self-
reported childhood trauma that has been noted in many studies (e.g., Chu & Dill, 1990). This
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is not to say that aversive childhood experiences play no role in dissociative experiences. It
may well be the case that such experiences underlie high DES scores, fantasy proneness and a
positive response bias (e.g., Lawrence, Edwards, Barraclough, Church & Hetherington, 1995).
However, studies that rely on self-report measures of traumatic events are not suitable to
evaluate this possibility.
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